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“The Driver's Whip is an evil thing”: Enlightenment as Mass Enslavement in the Works of Thomas 
Pynchon
Does Britannia, when she sleeps, dream? Is America her dream?-- in which all 
that cannot pass in the metropolitan Wakefulness is allow'd Expression away in 
the restless Slumber of these Provinces, and on West-ward, wherever 'tis not 
yet mapp'd, nor written down, nor ever, by the majority of Mankind, seen,-- 
serving as a very Rubbish-Tip for subjunctive Hopes, for all that may yet be 
true,-- Earthly Paradise, Fountain of Youth, Realms of Prester John, Christ's 
Kingdom, ever behind the sunset, safe til the next Territory to the West be seen
and recorded, measur'd and tied in, back into the Net-Work of Points already 
known, that slowly triangulates its Way into the Continent, changing all from 
subjunctive to declarative, reducing Possibilities to Simplicities that serve the 
ends of Governments,-- winning away from the realm of the Sacred, its 
Borderlands one by one, and assuming them unto the bare mortal World that is
our home, and our Despair.
Thomas Pynchon – Mason & Dixon
[PAUSE]
For those who have not yet encountered his work, Thomas Pynchon is an 
American writer of novels, short stories and occasional journalistic pieces who 
was born in 1937 and won the National Book Award for his 1973 novel, 
Gravity's Rainbow which was also selected for the Pulitzer Prize by the jury, 
although overturned by the board. He is, although he dislikes the term, a 
recluse; his whereabouts are unknown and there are extremely few 
photographs of him; none recently.
Pynchon's novels are vast in scope (Gravity's Rainbow has over 400 
characters), but focus – as a broad-sweeping generalisation – on the path that 
America could have taken, but refused. His novels chart the route of the States 
back towards right-wing politics, particularly post-WW2, through analogies, or 
allegories, of postmodern historiographic metafiction. His tone veers between 
slapstick comedy and earnest sincerity: Gravitys Rainbow, for example, focuses
upon the transference of power post-WW2 to the US and the way this power is 
predicated upon weapons systems developed under the Nazi regime; the 
space-race and ICBMs all relied on the V-2 as their initial base.
Pynchon's other novels are possessed of equal grandeur. Mason & Dixon, the 
main focus of my talk today, examines the surveying work of the two 
eponymous leads and essentially offers Pynchon, in most appraisals, an 
opportunity to hold forth on Ludditism over 800 pages. As one would expect, 
however, of a book charting the course of the Line (the “Geometrick scar” as 
Pynchon terms it) which divided the North and South in the American Civil War,
Mason & Dixon is enmeshed, twofold, in notions of slavery.
On the one hand, the novel's protagonists bring to the fore, through what 
Christy L. Burns has called Pynchon's parallactic mode, the dramatic irony of 
our knowledge, as readers, of the significance that the astronomers' Line will 
have for America, and the world, through slavery; a dramatic irony based on an
anachronism that is central to Pynchon's postmodern historiography and 
subverted subjunctive hope, as expressed in that opening passage. On the 
other, the preoccupation with Ludditism that informs the entirety of Pynchon's 
corpus places a Frankfurt-school-esque Dialectic of Enlightenment at the heart 
of the works. This comes to us, however, via a difficult philosophical refraction, 
for the well-known formulation Kant put forward in his “What is Enlightenment” 
is that “Enlightenment is man's release from his self-incurred tutelage”. This 
view, quite clearly, sees Enlightenment as liberation from our bondage; two of 
the other parties at this table, Pynchon and the Frankfurt School, see, if you'll 
excuse my Adornion paraphrasing, Enlightenment as Mass Enslavement. 
In this paper I will make an attempt to reconcile these two troubling poles – the 
historico-mimetic and the philosophical – through a third lens; the distorted 
version of Kant's Enlightenment presented by Michel Foucault.
In a 1978 introduction to Georges Caguillhem's The Normal and the 
Pathological, Foucault carves the Enlightenment into three phases: 1.) the 
coming-into-being of “scientific and technical rationality” as a component of 
“productive forces” and “political decisions”; 2.) rationalism as a Utopian 
“hope” for a predestined “revolution”; and 3.) Enlightenment “as a way to 
question the limits and powers it has abused. Reason – the despotic 
enlightenment”.1 
To begin a parallel reading of Pynchon and Foucault along this theme, it is easy
to deal with the first of these temporal phases. Certainly, Enlightenment, for
Pynchon,  is  situated  at  the  locus  of  politics  and  technology  mediated  by
production  and  consumption.  For  instance,  Gravity's  Rainbow  presents  this
1 Foucault, “Introduction,” 10-11.
through a Weberian framework of rational bureaucracy, the logical outcome of
which is IG Farben – who produced Zyklon B gas for the holocaust – and the
Phoebus cartel  while  Mason & Dixon  deploys  the Jesuit  telegraph system –
which parodies contemporary geo-stationary satellite relay – and the constant
positivist assertions of characters throughout: “You'll note how very scientifick
we are here Gentlemen”.
The second of Foucault's phases, however, is more difficult to cover. Evidently,
a “Utopian” hope must imply both of its Greek homophonic prefixes, the best
and the impossible, conflated into one. Certainly there is a moment in Mason &
Dixon  where  such  a  hope  is  situated,  within  an  overriding  framework  of
subjunctive possibility yet undermined by its impossibility. This is the purported
tale wherein Dixon is reputed to have snatched the whip from the hands of a
slave driver and attacked him with it.
Moving, then, to  deal with Slavery at this mimetic level in Mason & Dixon, this
episode and its theme, which Charles Clerc has called that for which Pynchon
“saves his greatest wrath”2 and which other critics have regarded as utterly
central  to  Mason  &  Dixon3,  is  presented  within  a  much-commented  upon
anachronistic  structure.  Indeed,  Dixon's  assault  on  the  slave-vendor  is
pointedly contextualised from the reader's knowledge of the later significance
of  the  Line  for  the  Civil  War,  liberal  values  and  slavery:  “'Go  back  to
Philadelphia,'  someone  shouts  at  Dixon.”4 This  moment  of  hope  for  Dixon
represents,  as Jeffrey Staiger puts it  with allusion to Griffith's 1915 film, an
2 Charles Clerc, Mason & Dixon & Pynchon (Lanham: University Press of America, 2000), 103-104.
3 Hinds, “Introduction: The Times of Mason & Dixon,” 14; Parrish, From the Civil War to the Apocalypse: 
Postmodern History and American Fiction, 185; Thill, “The Sweetness of Immorality: Mason & Dixon and the 
American Sins of Consumption,” 49.
4 Mason & Dixon, 699.
“alternative space of imaginative and ultimately political possibility, an America
without inequality and injustice that hovered like the ghost of an ideal over the
birth of a nation”.5 However, this boundless possibility is tempered, twofold, by
the  narrative  situation  whereby  the  certainty  of  Dixon's  interference  is
questioned:  “'No  proof,'  declares  Ives”6;  and,  for  Staiger,  in  its  fictional
boundaries: it “exists only as a conjecture in Mason & Dixon”.7 This is because
the action is situated at the junction of three temporal points: Dixon's supposed
1755  attack,  Wicks  Cherrycoke's  17868 post-revolutionary  war  storytelling
frame narrative and Pynchon's late twentieth-century perspective, the effect of
which  Mitchum Huehls  has  attributed  in  part  to  a  ventriloquizing  “Chinese-
boxed” style.9 For a Foucauldian temporal specificity of Enlightenment, this has
interesting consequences.
In  one  sense,  then,  this  episode  can  be  seen  to  present  Enlightenment's
Utopian hope for a predestined revolution through the fusion of ante- and post-
bellum perspectives. Mason and Dixon's antipathy towards slavery seems to be
on track  as  the  winning  side,  apparently  strengthened through  the  layered
twentieth-century  viewpoint.  Foucault's  mid-stage  Enlightenment  appears
confirmed: the teleology of progress seems, for the inhabitants of  Mason &
Dixon, to wend its way. However, Pynchon's narrative is not so straightforward;
the overlayed parallactic effect makes perspicuous the fact that inequality is
not eradicated, but rather masked in the contemporary era. As Rousseau puts
5 Jeffrey Staiger, “James Wood s Case Against ‘Hysterical Realism’ and Thomas Pynchon,” ʼ Antioch Review 66, no. 4 
(Fall): 641.
6 Mason & Dixon, 695.
7 Staiger, “James Wood’s Case,” 641.
8 Mason & Dixon, 6.
9 Mitchum Huehls, “‘The Space that may not be seen’: The Form of Historicity in Mason & Dixon,” in The Multiple 
Worlds of Pynchon s Mason & Dixon : Eighteenth-Century Contexts, Postmodern Observationsʼ , ed. Elizabeth Jane 
Wall Hinds (Rochester  NY: Camden House, 2005), 32-40.
it  in  Emile:  “[t]here  is  no  subjection  so  perfect  as  that  which  keeps  the
appearance of  freedom”.10 This  is,  for instance, explored in  Pynchon's  2006
novel  Against  the  Day through  Hop  Fung,  the  owner  of  the  white  slave
simulation industry with which Dally Ridout becomes involved11, this parody on
slave “colour” also having been posited in  Gravity's  Rainbow  where Claude
Gongue the “notorious white slaver of Marseilles” encounters problems with his
quarry  who  wish  to  be  green  and  magenta  slaves.12 By  making  clear  the
outrage felt  when the  racial  “norms”  are  reversed,  highlighted through  the
Baudrillardian hyper-reality of the simulation13 and the Conradian implication of
agent-provocateuresque behaviour, Pynchon reveals the injustice of that very
“normality” through a  reductio ad absurdum of the group-boundaries across
which empathic identification must, but often fails to, traverse: “whites in both
places are become the very Savages of their own worst Dreams”.14
Furthermore,  this  middle-phase  Enlightenment  is  further  problematised  in
Pynchon because of the interdependence of the narrative layers. If, even at one
level,  a positivist ethical abolitionist teleology is proposed, it  is  concomitant
that the sceptical contemporary voice protests that Enlightenment rationality
was instrumental in first creating slavery for, and then turning slavery to, its
own ends; first it conquered and then deployed. Brian Thill puts this one way
when discussing the astronomers' fantasies of using slave labour15 –  “slavery
leading  the  charge  to  Enlightenment”16 –  while  Pynchon  puts  it  another:
10 Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Emile: or, On education, trans. Allan Bloom (New York: Basic Books, 1979), 120.
11 AtD, 339-340.
12 GR, 246.
13 See Jean Baudrillard, “Simulacra and Simulations,” in Selected Writings, ed. Mark Poster, trans. Paul Foss and Paul 
Patton, trans. , Beitchman (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2002), 172.
14 Mason & Dixon, 301.
15 Ibid., 69.
16 Thill, “The Sweetness of Immorality: Mason & Dixon and the American Sins of Consumption,” 73.
“Commerce without Slavery is unthinkable”, a slavery which depends upon the
“gallows”.17
To delve further into this phenomenon of the applicability, or continuation of,
slavery  to  contemporary  capitalism  in  Pynchon's  works,  it  is  necessary  to
explore Pynchon's relativism. Much of Pynchon's work is predicated upon trans-
temporal relativistic metaphor, which I will here explore, initially, through his
treatment of the Holocaust, before returning to slavery. This is best seen in
Pynchon's  early  works,  V.  and  Gravity's  Rainbow  through  the  character
Lieutenant Weissman.
Weissman  (note:  white  man)  is  the  character  otherwise  known  as  Captain
Blicero (the bleacher) in Gravity's Rainbow; the sadistic Nazi responsible for the
launch of Rocket 00000: the Schwarzgerät and its sacrificial asymmetric load,
his sex slave Gottfried. However, even in  V., Weissman's tendencies towards
extreme  right  wing  politics  are  manifested  through  his  interrogation  of
Mondaugen's  knowledge  of  “D'Annunzio”,   “Mussolini”,  “Fascisti”  and  the
“National Socialist German Workers' Party”. Finally, he is disappointed: “'From
Munich and never heard of Hitler,' said Weissman, as if 'Hitler' were the name
of  an  avant-garde  play”.18 Weissman  is  also,  dressed  in  his  1904  get-up19,
instrumental  in  the  conflation  of  two  historical  periods  that  occurs  during
Foppl's Siege Party; the Nazi regime, who perpetrated the Holocaust and the
German Südwest, who committed genocide against the Herero populous. The
cumulative effect of this evidence is dramatic for it not only serves to build a
horrific awareness of the genocidal drive enacted by von Trotha against the
17 Mason & Dixon, 108.
18 V., 242.
19 Ibid., 260.
Herero population in 1904, but also, crucially, provides a referent for the Nazi
death camps. Pynchon, in his aside quip on Weissman – “[t]his is only 1 per
cent of six million, but still pretty good” – relativizes the Holocaust.20
This  is,  of  course,  ethically  tenuous  and  is  cross-applicable  to  Pynchon's
treatment  of  slavery.  Pynchon's  first  novel,  V.,  was  written  at  the  apex  of
Postmodern Historiography,  best  embodied by Hayden White.  White,  known
primarily for the extension of Hegelian emplotment advanced in Metahistories,
suggests that there is, essentially, only a single difference between narrative
history  and  fiction:  the  claim  to  truth.21 As  a  causal  chain  is  constructed
between the events  of  the chronology,  White  claims the emergence of  “an
inexpungable  relativity  in  every  representation  of  historical  phenomena”,  a
relativity  that  “is  a  function  of  the  language used to  describe  and thereby
constitute past events as possible objects of explanation and understanding”.22
Such  statements,  when  revolving  around  the  Holocaust,  have  found  poor
reception among those with the greatest right to specify the appropriate modes
of representation: the survivors. Perhaps the most uncompromising of these
voices is the perspective of Elie Wiesel who believes, not only in the absolutism
of his  experience, but also in its  quale-like inexpressibility:  “only those who
lived  it  in  their  flesh  and  in  their  minds  can  possibly  transform  their
experiences into knowledge. Others, despite their best intentions, can never do
so”.23 Wiesel's view is intensely problematic. While White might take issue with
the possibility of  transforming any experience into knowledge, this  absolute
stance also impinges upon the pedagogical function of history. To exclude the
20 Pynchon, V., 245; 
21 White, Metahistory, 93-97.
22 White, “Historical Emplotment and the Problem of Truth,” 37.
23 Wiesel, From the Kingdom of Memory, 166.
possibility of total empathic response by banishing Holocaust experience to the
realm  of  the  ineffable  is,  in  the  sense  of  Wittgenstein's  Tractarus  Logico-
Philosophicus, to which Pynchon makes repeated reference in V.,   to designate
it as on par with the “mystical”24, that which “we must pass over in silence”
and about which nothing meaningful can be said.25
To think about this relativism in terms of slavery and to return to the theme of 
Enlightenment, at one level, then, it appears to do a disservice to the victims 
and survivors of slavery when Pynchon moves his discourse from the marked 
body of the slave, the cruelty of the driver's whip to a distinctly contemporary 
commerce which also cannot function without a new form of “slavery”. After all,
the experience of the checkout assistant is surely incomparable to that of 
African slaves, shipped from their homes to a savagely dehumanising world 
wherein they become property. Pynchon often forgets this; regardless of the 
era's supposed disdain for meta-narratives, his is apocalyptic. This is conveyed 
in an ironic heroization of the present, be it in Gravity's Rainbow's faux 
optimistic sing-along “Now everybody– ”, Vineland and Inherent Vice's elegiac 
fogs for the Sixties, or Against the Day's airborne sailing towards a “grace” in a 
Calvinist sense, but which is actually World War 2, which seems to 
symmetrically parallel the earlier nautical disaster climax to V.. It can often 
seem that, for Pynchon, things are just getting worse, or at least no better: 
capitalism, from slavery, appears but little improvement.
In a consideration of this relativism of slavery, then, two modes have to be 
dealt with: representational relativism and trans-historical relativism. As 
24 TLP, sec 6.522.
25 Ibid., sec 7.
regards the former, it must be noted that the absolutism of experience that 
would do justice to victims is, itself, deeply problematic. When the survivors of 
a historical trauma are all dead and gone, their experience must pass into the 
inherent relativism of language if it is not to be forgotten. As such, 
representational relativism can be construed as an ethical action. Cartesians 
will claim that it can never reconstitute the experience itself but, then, at least 
it can salvage what remains.
This is more difficult with trans-historical relativism. While it may be 
disrespectful to trace a lineage of slavery to wage-slavery, especially given that
slavery is, I am extremely saddened to say, still alive and well in its most brutal
forms today, it is still a valid genealogical tracing. Pynchon illustrates this twice
in his work, firstly via the Calvinist schema of the Preterite and the Elect and 
secondly, more directly.
To deal with the more direct treatment of the issue first, it is only necessary to 
quote the episode in which Dixon is discussing whether the condition of 
weavers in Stroud is comparable to the slavery he finds in America: “I have 
encounter'd Slavery both at the Cape of Good Hope, and in America, and 'tis 
shallow Sophistry, to compare it with the condition of a British Weaver”. The 
retort given to this reads: “You've had the pleasure of Dragoons in your 
neighborhood? They prefer rifle-butts to whips,--- the two hurt differently,-- 
what otherwise is the difference in the two forms of Regulation?  Masters 
presume themselves better than any who, at their bidding, must contend with 
the real forces and distances of the World,-- no matter how good the pay.  
When Weavers try to remedy the inequality by forming Associations, the 
Clothiers bring in Infantry to kill, disable, or deliver up to Transportation any 
who be troublesome”. In this case, Pynchon seems, by giving Dixon's 
antagonist the stronger argument, to endorse the view that comparison of 
slavery to capitalism is an ethically viable move.
In considering how Pynchon's complex play on preterition and election ties in, 
however, we return to notions of Enlightenment and emancipation. Although I 
don't have time to give a full rundown here, Gravity's Rainbow and Against the 
Day both feature, extensively, the labels preterite, for the dispossessed, and 
elect, for the successful capitalists. Such a reference to Calvin's theology (in 
which God has pre-selected those who will be saved and those who will be 
damned and there is nothing one can do to change it) is important for a 
consideration of Enlightenment and enslavement. If Pynchon's work is truly the 
nihilistic pit of impossibility so often proposed – in which, quoting here from 
Pynchon's non-fiction essay on Sloth, “nearer my couch to thee”, we are no 
longer able to sever our identities from the Enlightenment technocracy around 
us: “that which increasingly defines us, technology” – then it is not surprising 
that the Calvinist doctrine is deployed across almost all his works, for even if 
the Preterite gain knowledge, their fate is still predetermined, Enlightened, or 
not. It is not, then, who or what we can dominate under an Adornion schema of 
Enlightenment that is presented in Pynchon's works, but rather a more 
Foucauldian notion of what we can, in both a practical and Kantian sense, 
know. As Pynchon puts it: “we do know what's going on, and we let it go on”. 
The Enlightenment paradigm of knowledge ties in with a helpless 
predestination where knowledge of one's election or preterition makes no 
difference, for one cannot alter one's state. Knowledge does not lead to action 
which could free us; enlightenment appears as, if not enslavement itself, then 
certainly not a liberation.
To wrap things up here, I will end with one last example from Gravity's Rainbow
that works on this troubled double-edge of Enlightenment as a liberating 
knowledge: the tale of Byron the Bulb. In this episode, often cast as “surreal” or
bizarre, it is revealed that a light bulb named “Byron” is demonstrably 
“immortal”, to the great displeasure of the multinational cartels who thrive on 
the inbuilt redundancy of their products and whose enterprise would be 
subversively undermined should news of this particular bulb become public.26 
Obviously, entwined in this allegory of capitalism and power is the notion of 
Enlightenment; Byron, although nominatively  Romantic, is not an agent of 
illumination without reason. A coherent reading of this Enlightenment context is
made by Patrick McHugh, who asserts that Byron's tale mirrors Adorno and 
Horkheimer's “enlightenment of the Enlightenment”, acting as the solely clued-
up agent against the Phoebus system which, although “ostensibly committed to
the Enlightenment, to bringing light into the world, uncovering truth, 
empowering freedom and justice”, actually “is no more than a cog in a vast 
cooperate cartel that uses Enlightenment as a ruse in service of social control”.
Against this intricate network of power  stands Byron, “the dissident intellectual
enabled by his position in the social system to perceive the repressiveness of 
the system and dedicated to transforming his role from cultural agent of 
repression to cultural agent of freedom”.27
While McHugh remains sceptical of the capacity of such a figure to mount
26 GR, 647-655.
27 Patrick McHugh, “Cultural Politics, Postmodernism, and White Guys: Affect in Gravity s Rainbow,” ʼ College 
Literature 28, no. 2 (Spring): 1-28.
any  effective  resistance,  entwined  as  it  is  within  the  hegemonic  white-guy
structure, such an interpretation is valuable in this context for its recognition of
the Foucauldian entanglement of knowledge and power, but neglects an even
stronger aspect to emerge from the narrative. As McHugh notes, Byron's world
of  resistance  gradually  collapses  through  the  aesthetic  movements;
Romanticism to Modernism to Postmodernism. There are two features of this
contraction,  however,  which  must  be  foregrounded:  firstly,  Byron's  world
shrinks to the point of personal betterment with disregard to societal influence
– a very Voltarian trope; secondly, and more importantly, dominant systems
depend upon ignorance and unenlightened states, a potential breakdown in the
simple trajectory of Enlightenment to capitalist rationality. The state in which
Byron finds himself  may be an accurate account  of  Enlightenment's  results
from a sceptical viewpoint, but it is certainly a deviation from Kant's original
formulation,  for  it  seems  as  though  Byron  actually  exists  in  a  state  of
unenlightened immaturity, self-incurred tutelage; in losing the will to revolution
and  regressing  to  darkness,  is  Pynchon  critiquing  Enlightenment,  what
Enlightenment has become or, in fact, the state in which the bulb has gone out:
unenlightened humanity?
Pynchon's Enlightenment fiction, therefore, fuses aspects of many thinkers into
a hybrid beast. It is not strictly Kantian, for the positive liberation from our own
enslavement that knowledge should bring has not come to fruition. It is not
strictly in line with the Frankfurt School, for although it would be fair to say that
Pynchon sees a totalitarian nature in Enlightenment, Pynchon seems to imply
that  the  knowledge  brought  by  Enlightenment  would  be  crucial  for  any
potential  resistance,  even  if  that  resistance  has  never  come-into-being,
remaining  forever  a  regulative  idea.  Enlightenment,  then,  as  mass
enslavement?  No.  This  is  too  simple  a  construct,  even  if  the  themes  do
converge massively in Pynchon's work. While Pynchon himself is, in one way,
situated in the third of Foucault's camps – his work sits in the enlightenment
tradition and uses its own knowledge to self-criticise – such a stance considers
only  a  single  Enlightenment  tradition,  whereas  Pynchon's  writing  contains,
quite clearly, an amalgamation of multiple schools of thought on slavery and
enlightenment. If  Mason & Dixon  brings together these divergent thinkers of
Enlightenment in its representation of a line that scarred America, before we
can talk about that line I would like to close with the observation that we must,
first, ask in which tradition of enlightenment and liberation we are thinking. Are
we looking at trans-historical metaphorical relativism and the ethical validity of
applying  slavery  to  the  contemporary,  Enlightened,  capitalist  era?  Are  we
looking at the complex intersection of mimetic spheres and dramatic irony in
Pynchon's treatment of slavery? Are we looking at our potential enslavement to
the Enlightenment paradigm? While I hope I have touched upon each of these
aspects and their interrelation today, it demonstrates the importance of first
asking : whose Line is it anyway?
